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Abstract— One of the main theoretical motivations for the
emerging area of network coding is the achievability of the max-
flow/min-cut rate for single source multicast. This can exceed the
rate achievable with routing alone, and is achievable with linear
network codes. The multi-source problem is more complicated.
Computation of its capacity region is equivalent to determination
of the set of all entropy functions Γ∗, which is non-polyhedral.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that this difficulty can
arise even in single source problems. In particular, for single
source networks with hierarchical sink requirements, and for
single source networks with secrecy constraints. In both cases,
we exhibit networks whose capacity regions involve Γ∗. As in the
multi-source case, linear codes are insufficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding [1], [2] generalizes routing by allowing in-
termediate nodes to perform coding operations which combine
received data packets. One of the most celebrated benefits of
this approach is increased throughput in multicast scenarios.
This stimulated much of the early research in the area. One
fundamental problem in network coding is to understand the
capacity region and the classes of codes that achieve capacity.
In the single session multicast scenario, the problem is well
understood. In particular, the capacity region is characterized
by max-flow/min-cut bounds and linear network codes are
sufficient to achieve maximal throughput [2], [3]. Network
coding not only yields a throughput advantage over routing, its
capacity can be easily determined, and easily achieved. This is
in stark contrast to routing, where computation of the capacity
region and of optimal routes is fundamentally difficult.
Significant practical and theoretical complications arise in
more general multicast scenarios, involving more than one
session. An expression for the capacity region is known [4],
however it is given by the intersection of a set of hyperplanes
(specified by the network topology and connection require-
ment) and the set of entropy functions Γ∗. Unfortunately,
this capacity region, or even the inner and outer bounds [5]–
[7] cannot be computed in practice, due to the lack of an
explicit characterization of the set of entropy functions for
more than three random variables. This difficulty is not simply
a consequence of the particular formulation of the capacity
region given in [4]. It was recently shown that the problem of
determining the capacity region for the multi-source problem
is in fact entirely equivalent to the determination of Γ¯∗,
the set of almost entropic functions [8]. Furthermore, the
non-polyhedral nature of Γ¯∗, revealed in [9] implies a non-
polyhedral capacity region (in contrast to the max-flow result
for single sources). To make things even worse, it is also
known that linear network codes are not sufficient for the
multi-source problem [3], [8].
In this paper, we show that non-polyhedral capacity regions
can occur even in single source scenarios. We demonstrate
this phenomenon for single source networks with hierarchical
sink constraints, and for single source networks with security
constraints. Our approach is in the spirit of our recent work
[8], which revealed a deep duality between network codes
and entropy functions. Direct consequences are non-polyhedral
capacity regions, the insufficiency of linear network codes and
the importance of non-Shannon information inequalities.
Section II provides the basic setup for secure network
codes, and formally defines achievability and admissibility for
networks with wiretapping adversaries. Section III focuses on
the single source incremental multicast scenario, in which the
sinks have hierarchical requirements. Given a function g, we
construct an incremental multicast network that is solvable if
and only if g is entropic. In Section IV we construct a special
single source secure multicast problem which is equivalent to
an insecure multi-source multicast problem. Invoking the du-
ality results from [8] these constructions relate the solvability
of both single-source incremental multicast and single source
secure multicast, to multi-source multicast problems.
II. BACKGROUND
The network topology will be modeled by a directed acyclic
graph G = (P, E). Vertices u ∈ P correspond to communi-
cation nodes and directed edges e ∈ E are error-free point-
to-point communication links. The connection requirement
M , (S, O,D) is specified by three components. The set
S indexes the independent multicast sessions, each of which
is a collection of packets to be multicast to a prescribed set of
destinations. The session-source location mapping O : S 7→ P
specifies the originating node O(s) for session s. The receiver-
location mapping D : S 7→ 2P indicates the set of nodes
D(s) ⊆ P which require the data of session s.
A network code is identified by a set of discrete random
variables {TS ,WE}, defined on finite sample spaces, where for
concise notation, set-valued subscripts denote a set of objects
indexed by the set, e.g. ZX = {Zi, i ∈ X}. The source
random variables Ts, s ∈ S are mutually independent and
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2are uniformly distributed on sample spaces whose size will
be denoted |Ts|. The variables We, e ∈ E are the messages
transmitted over link e.
Since the network is acyclic, variables in TS and WE can
be ancestrally ordered according to the network topology.
Causal coding requires that edge messages are conditionally
independent of their non-incident ancestral messages given
their incident source and message variables.
Definition 1: A network code is probabilistic if there exists
an outgoing link message which is not a function of the incom-
ing source and link messages. Otherwise, it is deterministic.
Probabilistic network codes can be implemented via using
independent random variables Vu (internal randomness) at
each node u ∈ P such that all outgoing messages from a
node are deterministic functions of incoming sources and link
messages and the independent randomness generated at the
node. It is easy to prove that all probabilistic network codes
can be implemented in this way. Accordingly, we shall specify
a probabilistic network code by the set {TS ,WE , VP}.
Lemma 1: Given random variables X1, X2 and V , if V is
independent of X1 and X2, and X2 is a function of X1 and
V , then X2 is a function of X1 alone
The implication of the lemma is as follows. At the sinks (or
any intermediate node) of the network, if reconstruction of the
source messages is possible, then it can also be achieved in
the absence of “internal randomness”. In fact, in the absence
of security constraints, it is known that deterministic network
codes are sufficient [6]. This is not always the case for the
wiretapping scenarios considered in Section IV.
In addition to legitimate sinks, there are |R| adversaries,
which can eavesdrop any message transmitted along a given
collection of links. Each adversary attempts to reconstruct a
particular set of source messages, according to a wiretapping
pattern.
Definition 2 (Wiretapping pattern): The wiretapping pat-
tern is specified by a collection of tuples (Ar,Br) for r ∈ R
such that Ar ⊆ S is the subset of sources to be reconstructed
by adversary r, which observes only the links in Br.
For a given network code designed with respect to a
connection requirement M , define Pe as the error probability
that at least one receiver fails to correctly reconstruct one or
more of its requested source messages. A zero-error network
code is one for which Pe = 0, and hence the source messages
TS can be perfectly reconstructed at desired sinks. The goal
of secure communications is to transmit information such that
any eavesdropper listening to the traffic on all the links in
Br remains “ignorant” of the data transmitted by the sources
in Ar. A perfectly secure network code is one for which the
information leakage I (TAr ;WBr ) = 0 for all r ∈ R.
Definition 3 (Admissible rate-capacity tuple): Given a net-
work G = (P, E) and a connection requirement M , a rate-
capacity tuple (λ, ω) , (λS , ωE) is admissible if there exists
a perfectly secure, zero-error network code Φ = {Wf , f ∈
S ∪ E}, such that
H(We) ≤ log |we| ≤ ωe, ∀e ∈ E ,
H(Ts) = log |ws| ≥ λs, ∀s ∈ S,
where We is the message symbol transmitted along link e and
Ts is the input symbol generated at source s.
The preceding definitions consider zero-error network codes
and perfect security. Relaxing these requirements prompts the
following definition.
Definition 4 (Achievable): A rate-capacity tuple (λ, ω) is
achievable if there exists a sequence of network codes Φ(n)
and normalizing constants r(n) > 0 such that
lim
n→∞
1
r(n)
H
(
W (n)e
)
≤ lim
n→∞
1
r(n)
log |w(n)e | ≤ ωe, ∀e ∈ E ,
lim
n→∞
1
r(n)
H
(
T (n)s
)
= lim
n→∞
1
r(n)
log |w(n)s | ≥ λs, ∀s ∈ S,
lim
n→∞Pe
(
Φ(n)
)
= 0,
lim
n→∞
1
r(n)
I(T (n)Ar ;W
(n)
Br
) = 0, ∀r ∈ R.
In the absence of any security constraints, |R| = 0, these
definitions reduce to the usual ones and the multi-source,
multi-sink capacity region is given by [4]. Bounds for the
multi-source multi-sink scenario with wiretappers were given
in [10].
III. INCREMENTAL MULTICAST
In this section, we study a the special case of incremental
multicast, meaning that the session indexes are totally ordered
such that a receiver requesting a particular session also re-
quests all sessions with lower index. We consider the simplest
incremental multicast scenario, with only two source messages
and no secrecy constraints (permitting deterministic codes).
We will show that determining the capacity region, even in
such a simple scenario, can be no simpler than solving the
general multicast problem.
Our approach is inspired by [8]. Let H[M] ⊂ R2N with
coordinates indexed by proper subsets of a ground set M
with N elements. Points h ∈ H[M] can be regarded as
functions, h : 2M 7→ R with h(∅) , 0. Given such an
h ∈ H[M] we will construct a special network G†, an
incremental connection requirement M† and a rate-capacity
tuple T(h) that is admissible if and only if h is entropic.
The network topology, connection requirement and link
capacities are defined in Figure 1, which for convenience,
is divided into several subnetworks. The single source node
is an open circle, labelled with the two available sessions
(this node is repeated for convenience in Figures 1(a), 1(b)
and 1(c)). The destinations are double circles, labelled with
their requirements. Intermediate nodes are solid circles. The
source and sink labels define the mappings O and D. Each
capacitated edge is labeled with a pair of symbols denoting
the edge capacity, and the edge message (and corresponding
random variable). Unlabelled edges are assumed to be unca-
pacitated, or to have a finite but sufficiently large capacity to
losslessly forward all received messages.
The first part of the network, shown in Figure 1(a), contains
the source where there are two independent sessions (i.e., two
messages S0 and S1) available. The desired source rates asso-
ciated with S0 and S1 are respectively
∑
i∈N h(i) and h(N ).
There are 2N specific edge messages that are of particular
3interest. Rather than naming all edge variables We, e ∈ E ,
we label these 2N particular edge variables Uj and Vj for
j = 1, . . . , N . Remaining edge variables will be labelled with
generic symbols Wi indexed by an integer i.
In Figure 1(a), the source node generates from S0
and S1 respectively the sets of network coded messages
{U1, U2, . . . , UN} and {V1, V2, . . . , VN} which are duplicated
as required and forwarded to the rest of the network. The
remainder of the network is divided into subnetworks of two
types, shown in Figures 1(b) and 1(c).
h(2), V2h(1), V1h(1), U1 h(2), U2 h(N), UN h(N), VN
∑
i
h(i) h(N )
S0, S1
(a) Source node
Vα{
∑
i∈N
h(i) + h(N )− h(α),W2
h(α),W1
S0, S1S0, S1
(b) Type 1 subnetworks
Ui
Vα
∑
i∈N
h(i) + h(N )− 2h(i)
Vi h(i)h(α, i)− h(α)
{{
Vi
Vα
h(i),W1
h(i),W2
h(i),W3
{
Uj : j != i
S0
S0, S1
S0, S1
P0
P1
(c) Type 2 subnetworks
Fig. 1. The network G†.
With reference to Figure 1(b), there are 2N − 1 type 1 sub-
networks, one for each nonempty α ∈ 2N . These subnetworks
introduce an edge of capacity h(N )−h(α) between the source
and a sink requiring S1. There is an intermediate node which
has another |α| incident edges (from Figure 1(a)), carrying
Vα = {Vj , j ∈ α}. The intermediate node then has an edge of
capacity h(α) to the sink.
Figure 1(c) shows the structure of type 2 subnetworks,
which are indexed by ∅ 6= α ⊂ N and an element i ∈ N , i 6∈
α. Each type 2 subnetwork connects the source to the upper
receiver. In addition, there are other incident edges carrying
{Vj : j ∈ α} and {Uj : j ∈ N}. For notational simplicity, we
have written h (α ∪ {i}) , h(α, i).
So far, we have described a network G†, a connection
requirement M† and have assigned rates to sources and
capacities to links. Clearly M† depends only on N , and not in
any other way on h. Similarly, the topology of the network G†
depends only on N . The choice of h affects only the source
rates and edge capacities, which are collected into the rate-
capacity tuple T(h). Also, we can assume without loss of
generality that T(h) is a linear function of h.
Definition 5: A function h ∈ H[N ] is called entropic if
there exists discrete random variables X1, . . . , XN such that
the entropy of {Xi : i ∈ α} is equal to h(α) for all ∅ 6= α ⊆
N . Furthermore, h is called quasi-uniform if any subset of the
variables are uniform over their support.
Theorem 1: For the network G† and a connection require-
ment M†, if a rate-capacity tuple T(h) is admissible, then h
is quasi-uniform and hence entropic.
Proof: Suppose that T(h) is admissible. By Definition 3,
admissibility of T(h) on G†,M† requires the existence of a
zero-error network code Φ with source messages S[α], ∅ 6=
α ⊆ N and a subset of its coded messages UN and VN . Given
this hypothesis, we will show that h is the entropy function
of VN , and that VN is quasi-uniform.
First focus on Figure 1(a). Applying min-cut bounds, it is
straightforward to prove
H(UN , VN ) =
∑
i∈N
H(Ui) +H(VN ),
H(Ui) = h(i),∀i ∈ N ,
H(VN ) = h(N ).
H(Vi) = h(i),∀i ∈ N .
Similarly, applying min-cut bounds to type 1 subnetworks of
Figure 1(b), H(Vα) ≥ h(α), ∅ 6= α ⊆ N .
We now focus on type 2 subnetworks of Figure 1(c) and
aim to prove that H(Vα) ≤ h(α) for any ∅ 6= α ⊆ N . In
order for the upper receiver to reconstruct S0 and S1,
H(W1,W2) + h(N ) +
∑
j 6=i
h(j)− 2h(i) ≥ H(S0, S1)
or equivalently, H(W1,W2) ≥ 2h(i). In addition,
H(W1,W2) ≤ H(Ui, Vi,W1,W2)
= H(Ui, Vi) ≤ 2h(i).
As a result, H(W1,W2) = H(Ui, Vi,W1,W2) which further
implies that Vi is a function of W1,W2. Thus Vi can be
recovered at P0. On the other hand, from the lower part of
the subnetwork,
H(Ui|W3) = H(Ui|W3, Uj , j 6= i) + I(Ui;Uj , j 6= i|W3)
(a)
= I(Ui;Uj , j 6= i|W3)
≤ I(Ui,W3;Uj , j 6= i) = 0
where (a) follows from the fact that S0 can be reconstructed at
the lower receiver. This implies that Ui can be reconstructed at
P1. From [8], that P0 can decode Vi and that P1 can decode Ui
further implies H(Vi|Vα) = h(α, i)− h(α). By mathematical
induction (similar to the proof of [8, Theorem 1]), the only
solution that satisfies all of the conditions above is when the
entropy function of VN is equal to h.
Finally, from type 1 subnetworks, the support of Vα is
at most 2h(α). Hence, Vα is indeed quasi-uniform (this also
implies that the Ui are quasi-uniform, via H(Ui) = H(Vi) =
h(i) and the independence of the Ui).
Theorem 2 (Converse): For the network G† and a connec-
tion requirement M†, a rate-capacity tuple T(h) is admissible
if h is quasi-uniform.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we can follow the approach in [8]
and easily extend the result to almost entropic functions.
4Theorem 3: For the network G† and a connection require-
ment M†, a rate-capacity tuple T(h) is achievable if and only
if h is almost entropic1.
IV. SECURE MULTICAST
Linear network codes (for single source multicast) that are
resilient to eavesdropping are considered in [11]. Sufficient
conditions for the existence of such codes was also derived.
This was further generalized in [12] to multi-source cases. A
similar result was also obtained in [13] which gives necessary
and sufficient conditions under which transmitted data are
safe from being revealed to eavesdroppers. All of the above-
cited works assume that the wiretapper aims to reconstruct
all sources. Similar results have been obtained where only a
subset of sources are to be reconstructed [14]. Inner and outer
bounds to the secure capacity region were given in [10].
We will now show that even for a simple single-session
secure multicast problem, determination of the capacity region
can be extremely hard. In particular, the problem is at least as
hard as any multi-source multi-session multicast problem.
Figure 2 shows the construction for a network G?. The
source message is X whose rate is d. The link capacities are
parametrized by 0 < c < d. There is a single eavesdropper
who only observes the message variable W3. Thus Figure 2
also specifies M?, and the wiretapping pattern A?,B?.
Xc,W1
c,K
c,W3
c,W4 c,W5
d− c,W2
X
P0
P1
Fig. 2. The network G?.
Proposition 1: Given network G? and connection (and se-
crecy) requirement M? depicted in Figure 2, if a rate-capacity
tuple T(h) is admissible then K is a function of W4.
Proof: From the capacity constraint on G?, we have
H(W1,W2) ≤ H(W1) +H(W2)
= c+ d− c
= H(X).
Together with the decodability requirement, H(X|W1,W2) =
0, we have
H(W1,W2) = H(W1) +H(W2)
H(W1,W2|X) = 0
H(W1,W2) = H(X)
H(W1) = c
H(W2) = d− c.
1A function h is almost entropic if it is the limit of a sequence of entropic
functions.
Applying a min-cut bound on the set of edge variables
{W2,W5}, we can also prove that H(W5) = c and
H(W5|X) = 0. On the other hand, the secrecy constraint
requires I(W3;X) = 0 and hence
I(W1;W3) = 0 (1)
as W1 is a function of X .
Now, we will show that H(W1|W3,W4) = 0. First,
I(W3,W4;X)
(a)
= I(W3,W4;W1, X)
= I(W3,W4;W1) + I(W3,W4;X|W1)
(b)
= I(W3,W4;W1)
where (a) follows from the fact that W1 is a function of X
and (b) follows from the conditional independence implied by
the underlying network topology. Using the same argument,
we can also prove that I(K,W3;X) = I(K,W3;W1).
Since W5 is a function of X and is thus independent of
internal randomness, Lemma 1 implies that H(W5|W3,W4) =
0. Together with H(W5) = c, we have
I(W3,W4;W1) = I(W3,W4;X)
≥ I(W3,W4;W5)
= H(W5) = c.
Since H(W1) = c, it implies that H(W1|W3,W4) = 0
or equivalently that W1 is a function of W3 and W4. Sim-
ilarly, using the same argument, we can also prove that
H(W1|K,W3) = 0.
Our final aim is to show that H(K) = H(W4) = c
and H(K,W4) = 2c. Clearly, both H(K) and H(W4) are
bounded above by c due to the edge capacity constraint. We
obtain a lower bound on the entropy of K as follows.
H(K) ≥ I(K;W1|W3)
= I(K;W1|W3) +H(W1|K,W3)
= H(W1|W3)
(a)
= H(W1) = c
where (a) follows from (1). Hence, H(K) = c. And similarly,
we can also prove that H(W4) = c.
Independence of W1 and W3 implies
H(K|W1,W3) = H(W1,K,W3)−H(W1,W3)
= H(K,W3)−H(W1,W3)
= H(K,W3)−H(W1)−H(W3)
(a)
= H(W3|K)−H(W3) ≤ 0,
where (a) follows from H(W1) = H(K) = c. Consequently,
H(K|W1,W3) = 0.
Similarly, H(W4|W1,W3) = 0. Finally,
2c ≥ H(W1,W3)
= H(W1,K,W3,W4)
≥ H(W1,K,W4)
(a)
= H(W1) +H(K,W4) ≥ 2c
5where (a) follows from independence of W1 and (K,W4).
Hence, H(K,W4) = c which further implies H(K|W4) =
H(W4|K) = 0.
Under a regularity condition (that 2c and 2d are integers),
the converse of Proposition 1 also holds.
Proposition 2 (Converse): For the network G? with connec-
tion (and secrecy) requirement M?, the specified rate-capacity
tuple is admissible if a secret key of a rate c can be transmitted
from the node P0 to P1.
Essentially, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that the admissi-
bility of the single source secure multicast problem depends
on communication of a secret key from P0 to P1. Adhering
several copies of G? together (see Figure 3), we can easily
generalize the network such that admissibility implies that
multiple secret keys must be transmitted across a network.
This turns the single source secure multicast problem into a
multi-source multicast.
Theorem 4: For any multicast problem (without secrecy
constraints), there exists a corresponding secure multicast
problem such that the multicast problem is admissible if and
only if the corresponding secure multicast problem is also
admissible. Consequently, using the single-source two sessions
network G† and a connection requirement M†, there exists a
secure multicast problem such that a rate capacity tuple T(h)
is achievable if and only if h is almost entropic.
X
wiretapped
K1
K2
K1K2
wiretapped
Fig. 3. Several copies of G?.
V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Theorems 3 and 4 show that even for a single-source
network multicast problem with two independent sets of
messages or for a single source secure multicast problem,
the determination of the set of achievable rate-capacity tuples
can be extremely hard. Following the same arguments as used
in [8], we can also prove the following results for a single-
source two-session multicast problem or for a single-source
single-session multicast problem with secrecy constraints:
1) Capacity regions are not polyhedral2 in general.
2) LP bounds are not tight in general.
3) Linear codes are not sufficient to achieve capacity.
In other words, finding capacity regions for (secure) multicast
problems seems to be a mission impossible. Not only are the
2That the single-source single-session secure multicast problem has a non-
polyhedral capacity region is somewhat surprising, since the region for the
same problem without the secrecy constraint is completely determined by the
min-cut bound
existing bounding techniques loose, the non-polyhedral nature
of the capacity region suggests that LP bounds cannot fully
characterize the region, even with the addition of more and
more newly discovered information inequalities. Any finite set
of such new inequalities can only further tighter the bound,
but can never yield the exact capacity region.
Despite the hardness of the problem, there are still many
questions to be answered. It is unclear what makes finding
the capacity region problem so difficult. In the case of a
single session multicast or the case where there are only
two sinks, capacity regions have explicit polyhedral charac-
terizations provided by min-cut bounds. On the other hand,
where there are many sinks, the capacity region can be
extremely complicated to characterize, even if there are only
two independent sessions. It will be of great importance to
classify the set of networks and connection requirements that
lead to polyhedral capacity regions characterized by min-cut
bounds or LP bounds.
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